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Abstract
We study the local evolution of cultural norms in West Germany in re-
action to the sudden presence of East Germans who migrated to the West
after reunification. These migrants grew up with very high rates of ma-
ternal employment, whereas West German families followed the traditional
breadwinner-housewife model. We find that West German women increase
their labor supply and that this holds within household. We provide ad-
ditional evidence on stated gender norms, West-East friendships, intermar-
riage, and childcare infrastructure. The dynamic evolution of the local effects
on labor supply is best explained by local cultural learning and endogenous
childcare infrastructure.
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1 Introduction
Cultural norms influence individual behavior and aggregate outcomes (e.g. Gi-
avazzi et al., 2013), especially when it comes to the labor supply decisions of women.
However, important questions on the origins and the evolution of cultural norms
remain unanswered. A series of seminal papers established the importance of tech-
nology (Alesina et al., 2013), social movements (Goldin, 1990), and of the family
(e.g. Ferna´ndez et al., 2004) as long-term drivers of change. Focusing on the dy-
namic evolution of norms, Ferna´ndez (2013) and Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) study
cultural norms in the presence of learning. Ferna´ndez (2013) proposes a model
of inter-generational learning where norms and women’s labor supply decisions
depend on a noisy public signal generated by women’s decisions in the preceding
generation. Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) model local information transmission that
generates changes in participation that are geographically heterogeneous, locally
correlated, and smooth in the aggregate, and use county-level data to compare the
calibrated model to observed participation decisions.
This paper presents causal evidence on the evolution of local cultural norms
and beliefs. We examine whether large inflows of immigrants speaking the same
language, but with different gender identities and cultural norms, can trigger the
local evolution of social norms and behavior of natives. We measure norms related
to gender that are reflected in female labor supply decisions. Specifically, we study
effects on weekly hours worked and on relative hours worked within households,
i.e. the share of hours worked by the wife. We carefully trace the evolution of
these effects over time and examine heterogeneity. Using a combination of admin-
istrative, census, and survey data sets, we examine different potential channels.
We provide direct evidence on the evolution of stated gender norms and beliefs,
local friendship-ties and intermarriages, as well as on the endogenous local supply
of publicly funded childcare infrastructure.
We exploit the setting of German reunification to investigate the effects of im-
migration on the evolution of local cultural norms. This setting is uniquely suited
for two reasons. First, East and West Germans held very different cultural norms
related to the role of women resulting in much higher female labor force partici-
pation in the East. As argued in the existing literature, this is the case because
the different political-economic systems imposed on East and West Germany led
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to different gender norms, identities of women, and beliefs about how maternal
employment affects children and the family: individuals who grew up under the
GDR regime are less traditional than individuals in West Germany (e.g. Campa
and Serafinelli, 2019; Lippmann et al., 2019; Bauernschuster and Rainer, 2012;
Beblo and Go¨rges, 2018). We describe these differences in detail in Section 2.1.
Second, the collapse of the Wall separating East and West Germany in 1989 re-
sulted in a sudden und unexpected large inflow of several million people who were
socialized under the regime of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the
territory of the former West Germany.1 These first-wave migrants were previously
sealed off from western influence and had limited information about local differ-
ences in economic conditions and cultural norms within the West. We argue, and
provide supporting evidence in Section 2.2 below, that this gives rise to meaningful
and quasi-random variation in the presence of East Germans in the West.2
The combination of the large inflows of East Germans with different cultural
norms present a unique opportunity to improve the understanding of the evolution
of local cultural norms in the West. East Germans were not perceived as foreigners
in West Germany and are very similar in many respects - but very different in their
view regarding the role of women. As a result, we think that this unique historical
setting gets us as close as is reasonably possible to the idea of an ideal experiment
for identifying the evolution of local cultural norms: Exogenously switching cul-
tural norms in large shares of the local population and then studying changes in
norms and behavior in the remaining local population.
To estimate effects, we use cross-regional variation in the inflow intensity within
different empirical models. Our main empirical model is a difference-in-differences-
event-study design that compares average changes in working hours of women (rel-
ative to their partner in the household) in high vs. low inflow regions in the years
before and after German reunification. The assumption underlying this specifica-
tion is that first-wave East German migrants did not select their destination in
1We refer to ”West Germany” and ”East Germany” using capitalized letters to describe the
regions of the former two states within Germany, although strictly speaking this is incorrect post
reunification.
2The historical literature has identified two waves of emigration out of East Germany. We
study effects of the ”first-wave” of migrants, which was largely uninformed. Hunt (2006)
andFuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2009) examine migration patterns post reunification. Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2009) show that migrants of the second wave (after 1997/98) were
more selected by age and education.
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West Germany based on existing trends in local cultural norms. To alleviate re-
maining concerns about potentially endogenous location choices of East Germans,
we also analyze local effects by distance to the former border. Here, we estimate
effects on differences in womens outcomes and gender gaps as a function of distance
in post- relative to pre-reunification years.
Our main finding is that the presence of more East Germans with less tra-
ditional gender norms changes the behavior of local women: We find significant
increases in the hours worked of employed women, and in the Western women’s
share of within household working hours.
We present a battery of robustness and placebo checks to support the validity of
our findings. In particular, we examine if our estimates reflect changes in local de-
mand for employment or endogenous compositional changes. In addition, we show
that the results are robust to specifications including different sets of individual-
level controls, to different region-specific trend specifications, different definitions
of how we measure exposure to East Germans and different sample restrictions.
We then examine in detail the time-patterns of the dynamic adjustments of the
local changes in female behavior. We find no reaction in the short run, persistent
reactions at the intensive margin in the medium- and long run. These time-patterns
are consistent with the mechanism of local cultural learning.
In terms of heterogeneity, we find effects that condition on labor force partici-
pation are strongest for women with children above the age of three. In contrast,
effects at the extensive margin appear to be strongest for women with young chil-
dren.3
Using supplementary data sources, we move on to document that the presence
of immigrants affects an index of agreement to stated cultural norms and beliefs.
We measure effects on beliefs about how maternal employment affects children
and the marriage. We find that western women exposed to a large influx of East
Germans, adjust their cultural norms and become less conservative. This is in line
with our interpretation of the labor supply effects.
Are these effects on labor supply and local cultural norms driven by personal
interactions or by other channels? Using individual-level information on friendship
3We return to and discuss the different impacts at the intensive and extensive margins in
the conclusions in the light of childcare infrastructure, theories of identity formation and local
cultural learning.
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networks, we show that East Germans slowly befriend West Germans, which is
especially true for stay-home mothers. This is consistent with our finding of no
effects in the short run. Moreover, we find that the rate of intermarriage of West
Germans with East Germans remains very low throughout. This speaks in favor
of theories of local cultural learning and against household bargaining.
Next, we document that the presence of immigrants with gender-egalitarian
local norms has led to local-level increases in the public provision of childcare.
In Germany, the public provision of childcare is governed at the district level
and shortages of public provision are shown to affect female labor supply (e.g.
Mu¨ller and Wrohlich, 2018). We find that districts with a larger influx of gender-
egalitarian East Germans started expanding child-care provision faster starting
several years after reunification. This immigration-induced change in public infras-
tructure potentially amplifies, or even triggered some of the labor supply responses
we find in the medium- and long run.
This project combines two strands of the existing literature. First, the existing
literature that focuses on the impact of immigration on receiving regions such as
political outcomes (e.g. Harmon, 2018), the level of public good provision Alesina
et al. (e.g. 1999), or preferences for redistribution (e.g. Dahlberg et al., 2012).
We add to this literature by exploiting the unique natural experiment of German
reunification to study effects of immigration on a different outcome of interest:
cultural norms regarding female labor supply.
Second, we provide quasi-experimental evidence on theories of identity forma-
tion and cultural change (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Fogli and Veldkamp,
2011; Ferna´ndez, 2013). These theoretical models highlight the importance of lo-
cal information transmission and behavioral mitigation in the process of identity
formation and of cultural learning. This paper contributes to the growing body of
empirical evidence showing that changes in the labor supply decisions of women
can have large social multiplier effects on current and future generations of women.
While there are various studies establishing strong intergenerational correlations
between the labor supply decision of one generation and the next (e.g. Ferna´ndez
et al., 2004; Olivetti et al., ming), the previous literature assessing the question of
identity formation and cultural learning in a causal manner is sparse. Alesina et al.
(2013) find that descendants of societies where the plow was used as predominant
agricultural tool have lower female labor market participation today, as well as
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less egalitarian gender norms. Ferna´ndez et al. (2004) use variation in the mobi-
lization rates of men in World War II to provide suggestive evidence that female
labor supply shocks in one generations have long-run consequences on the follow-
ing generations due to changes in cultural norms. On the individual level, Maurin
and Moschion (2009) and Mota et al. (2016) study short-run cultural learning ef-
fects and find positive effects of the labor supply decision of female neighbours on
women’s labor supply at the extensive margin. Nicoletti et al., (forthcoming) show
that there are substantial long-run family peer effects (of sisters) on a mother’s
labor supply decision.
Methodologically, this paper is related to the literature examining labor sup-
ply effects on natives of unexpected geographically localized inflows of migrants,
starting with Card (1990). Dustmann et al. (2016) provide a framework to recon-
cile findings in this literature. They summarize that studies that examine sudden
changes in the local composition of workers (the spatial approach) only find evi-
dence for displacement or wage effects when focusing on specific skill-, occupation-,
or age-groups, or interactions thereof. This also applies to the German context:4
Most closely related to our setting, Prantl and Spitz-Oener (201X) study wage-
effects of the same within-German first-wave migration post reunification that we
focus on in this study. They find no evidence for effects on West German native’
wages even exploiting variation within age- and occupation-specific cells, unless
interacting the labor supply shock with product market regulation. In contrast to
this literature, we study female and household-level labor supply decisions without
focusing on particular subsets of skill-, occupation- or age-groups in the local labor
markets, or product market interactions. We therefore believe our results cannot
be rationalized through existing empirical findings on labor supply effects. In line
with the existing literature, we document zero effects for males using this (only
spatial) approach. Moreover, we document effects for females and at the house-
hold level for the medium- and long-run. Borjas (2006) points out that local labor
4Glitz (2012) finds skill-specific displacement effects of Eastern and Central European ”ethnic
German” immigrants on West Germans working full-time in 1996-2001 by exploiting random
geographical variation due to placement policies. Dustmann et al. (2016) study short-run age-
and skill-specific local labor market responses to the sudden inflow of Czech workers along the
German-Czech border after reunification. They find evidence for displacement and that these
effects are driven by changes in ”inflows” to jobs rather than ”outflows” of existing workers.
Earlier papers do not find these negative effects on labor force participation for Germany (Bonin,
2005; D’Amuri et al., 2010).
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supply effects disperse over time and space. Last but not least, we provide direct
evidence that shows adjustment in stated local cultural norms.5
In sum, we believe this paper makes two important contributions to the litera-
ture. First, we document that immigrants with different cultural norms and beliefs
can trigger the evolution of cultural norms and behavior in receiving regions. We
discuss the dynamics that we find with respect to theories of identity formation
and cultural learning that will eventually result in uniform equilibrium outcomes.
Second, we document that immigrants might affect natives even with little direct
interaction by changing the local infrastructure. This finding has additional pol-
icy relevance at it implies that governments can affect the evolution local cultural
norms by changing public spending.
2 Female labor supply, German reunification and
the first wave of migration
The following section places the empirical analysis of this paper in context by
providing information on patterns of women’s labor supply and family policies in
East and West Germany before and after reunification. A more detailed discussion
can be found in section B.1 in the Appendix. In addition, we introduce the first
wave of East-West migration after the fall of the wall, which we use to examine
behavioral changes of women in West Germany.
5This paper is also related to a wider literature that uses German reunification to test economic
theory: Redding and Sturm (2008) and Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) estimate the importance of market
access for economic development at the region- and density at the within-city level. Burchardi
and Hassan (2013) show that West Germans with social ties to the East experienced higher wage
growth post reunification. Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016) study consumption behavior in reunified
East Germany and Lichter et al. (2016) trust and economic outcomes.
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2.1 Female labor supply in East and West Germany
Throughout the Cold War following World War II6, policies for women and families
as well as economic work incentives for women differed greatly between East and
West Germany (e.g. Trappe, 1996), resulting in very different patterns of female
labor supply and formal child care infrastructure.
As shown in Figure 1, women’s labor force participation in the former GDR
increased sharply in the 1970’s and 1980’s. By 1989 about 78 % of women in the
working age population7 participated in the labor forces (91 % including women
still in education), 27 % of them in part-time, usually working between 30 and 35
hours. To improve reconciliation of work and family life, the provision of public
child care was massively expanded, reaching almost universal coverage in 1989
(Figure A1).8
In West Germany, on the other hand, policies and cultural norms set strong
incentives to live within traditional role patterns, i.e. the traditional ”breadwinner
and non-employed housewife” model (e.g. Wippermann, 2015). Women usually
either stayed at home after they had children or entered part-time employment
after an extended break. As shown in Figure 1 and discussed in more detail in
Appendix B.1 in 1989 about 55 % of women participated in the labor force working
for on average 35 hours per week (average hours of all women amount to a about 18
hours per week). The share of mothers9 participating in the labor force (47 %) and
the hours worked (31 hours for employed mothers and 13 hours overall) was even
lower and full-time employment was rare (23 %). There was hardly any formal child
care provision for children under the age of three and school-aged children before
6Following WWII, Germany was divided into four zones. The zones occupied by Great Britain,
France and the United States, generally located in the western, northwestern and southern parts,
became West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) in 1949. The zone occupied by the Soviet
Union eventually became East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR). Berlin, located
within Soviet territory, was also divided into east and west zones. Startin in 1961, the border
separating West and East Germany became sealed, to prevent further East-to-West migration
and became known as the iron curtain. Prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 it
was possible for civilians to cross the border.
7In the former GDR, this was defined as all women between the age of 15 and 60 and 5/12 of
women aged 14 (e.g. Statistisches Amt der DDR, 1990).
8By 1989 about 80 % of children under the age of three and 98 % of children above the age
of three attended formal child care, mainly in full-time. After-school programs were attended by
85 % of primary-school-aged children (POS). In urban regions, the respective shares were almost
100 %.
9Defined as women with children under the age 18 in the household.
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reunification, with the exception of West Berlin.10 The consequences of maternal
employment and formal child care for children and marriage were subject to a
heated public, political and scientific debate (e.g. Schu¨tze, 1986; Fthenakis, 1989).
As shown in Figure 2 in 199111, about two-thirds of the West German population
agreed with the statement that a small child will certainly suffer if his or her
mother is employed. About one third of the West German population states that
a working mother cannot have the same hearty and trustful relationship with her
child as a non-working mother.
Previous studies show that the different politico-economic systems imposed on
East and West Germany causally12 triggered the evolution of different cultural
norms regarding the appropriate role of women. For example, using a spatial dis-
continuity at the border, Campa and Serafinelli (2019) show that women in East
Germany rate their career success to be more important than women in West Ger-
many. The results by Lippmann et al. (2019) suggest that women in east Germany
can earn more than their husband without putting their marriage at risk, having
to do more housework (”doing gender” hypothesis) or withdrawing from the labor
market. Lippmann and Senik (2018) provide evidence on smaller gender gaps in
math and several studies show that East and West Germans exhibit strikingly
different attitudes regarding the appropriate role of women, have different beliefs
about the potential costs of maternal employment for children and exhibit differ-
ent gender gaps in preferences for work (e.g. Bauernschuster and Rainer, 2012;
Beblo and Go¨rges, 2018). These studies do not find convergence of cultural norms
over time. East Germans still have different cultural norms after moving to West
Germany.
2.2 East to West Migration
A series of unforeseen political events and large-scale public demonstrations cumu-
lated in the fall of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989, and the formal reunification
10In 1990 almost 30 % of available child care places in West Germany were provided in West
Berlin. In our analysis, we exclude West Berlin.
11We are not aware of any data set containing representative information on beliefs and atti-
tudes before reunification.
12Note that to examine cultural learning effects after German reunification in West Germany,
we do not have to rely on this causality assumption. For our purpose it does not really matter
why cultural norms and the labor supply decision of women are different.
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of West and East Germany on October 3, 1990. Decades of East-to-West (net)
migration followed.
Extent of Migration We rely on administrative records from all West-German
registration offices in order to identify migrants from the East. In Germany, by
law (Bundesmeldegesetz §17) every person has to register any change in her place
of residence with the registration authorities within two weeks after moving. From
these records, we can construct exact measures of migration by age group and
year. Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the total migration flows over the years 1950 -
2015. It is evident that immigration from East Germany was almost completely
prevented during the period of the Wall, i.e. from August 1961 to November 1989.
Within three years after the sudden collapse of the Wall almost 1.05 Million people
immigrated from east to West Germany. This number corresponds to about 6.5%
of the population in the former GDR in 1989 and about 1,7 % of the population in
West Germany. In our analysis we focus on this sudden initial wave of immigration
from East Germany into West Germany in the three years after the fall of the wall.13
First-Wave Immigration We focus on the first-wave immigrants for three rea-
sons. First, this ensures that immigrants were socialized under the former GDR
regime. As already described and discussed in detail in Section B.1 in the Ap-
pendix, individuals who grew up in reunified East Germany were exposed to dif-
ferent family policies and female labor market patterns, e.g. child care provision
was massively reduced after reunification. Second, a large fraction of the early
migrants stayed in the region where they first immigrated to in West Germany.
We estimate the share of early migrants who stayed in the region they were first
observed to be around 75-85%.14 This is important because cultural learning likely
takes time. Third, and most importantly, we show in the following that the first
wave of immigrants from East Germany were primarily driven by distance and not
the economic conditions in the receiving counties.
13Due to differences in local data availability we base much of our results on inflows in 1991.
We do not find significant differences in location decisions within these early years, where data
is available.
14This estimate is based on representative data from the German Socio-economic panel study
(Wagner et al., 2007). See section 5 for details.
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Location Decisions of Migrants Panel (b) of Figure 3 maps the inflows in
1991 relative to the population in each district (equivalent to U.S. counties). It
is evident that the distance to the border is a key predictor of location choice.
We provide two additional pieces of evidence that first-wave migrants, who had
previously been sealed off from Western influence, were mostly uninformed: First,
Figure A2 plots the district-level inflow share against the distance to the former
border: early migration flows are strongly determined by distance. Adjusting for
observable characteristics of the receiving counties using the 1986 Census data on
the district-level barely changes the estimated slope coefficient. In contrast, there is
no distance-relation for West-West migration shown by the horizontal slopes in the
lower half of the figure. Both of this holds within States (panels b and d). Second,
we examine balancing of migration in Table A2.15 In contrast to early East-West
migration, West-West mobility during the same years can be explained very well
by observable county characteristics. This holds in particular when including State
fixed effects. Out of 27 local controls on industry structure, firms, religion, voting,
child care, demographics, housing and female labor supply, only four are significant
at the 10 percent level or higher for East-West migrants (column 2). In contrast,
23 are significant at the ten percent level of statistical significance for West-West
movers. Moreover, distance to the border strongly predicts East-West mobility,
but is virtually unrelated to West-West mobility. All in all, first-wave migrants
thus appear uninformed even in respect to levels in local characteristics. Note that
in our main Diff-in-Diff strategy, it is sufficient if these migrants were uninformed
of, and their migration decisions unrelated to, trends in local outcomes.
3 Empirical framework
We use a combination of administrative and survey data to study local cultural
learning effects in West Germany following German reunification. The various
datasets come at different levels of aggregation and we always use the lowest-level
possible.16
15Note that in our main empirical analysis, we do not need regions that received high inflows
to be similar to regions that received lower inflows.
16As a result, our analysis is conducted at the county level (”Kreis”) or the regional level
”Raumordnungsregion” (ROR), where a ROR usually consist of two districts and is a commonly
used definition of local labor markets based on commuter flows (e.g. Pischke and Velling (1997)).
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3.1 German Microcensus, Sample and Outcomes
Our main analysis is based on data from the German Microcensus, an annual
household survey that samples one percent of the German population. The Ger-
man Microcensus is the largest annual household survey in Europe and contains
various information on labor market outcomes and socioeconomic characteristics.
If selected, households are required to respond by law.
In our analysis, we use information covering the 1982 2015 period. More
precisely, we rely on information from 1982, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995,
1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2015. Before 1995,
this coincides with all waves that are available at a smaller regional level than
state-level.Hence, we have information on four pre-reunification years and 14 post
waves to study long-run cultural learning effects.
Our main sample consists of women aged 25 to 55, i.e. women who are out
of education but far from retirement, who have grown up and who are now living
in the Western part of Germany. Unfortunately, the Microcensus does not ask
directly if a respondent grew up in West Germany. To implement this restriction,
we identify and drop from the sample East Germans living in the West based
on their educational degree using recorded GDR-specific educational qualifications
that were universal until reunification.17 In our main estimation sample, we restrict
the analysis to cohorts born between 1945 and 1975. This ensures that we can
identify women growing up in the West. Descriptive statistics for the main sample
are reported in Table 1.
We focus on three main outcomes: (i) women’s working hours; (ii) working
hours of women in employment; and (iii) relative working hours within households.
Working hours are measured as contracted working hours per week. Relative
working hours are defined as the share of working hours provided by the women
in the household (either married or cohabiting).18 In addition, we include a vector
17For a detailed description on how we identify individuals who grew up under the former
GDR regime and plausibility checks, see section B.2 in Appendix B. Our results are not driven
by remaining very small number of misclassified East Germans living in the West.
18Identifying non-married cohabiting couples directly becomes possible with the introduction
of a new concept of living arrangements in 1996. In earlier waves, identifying non-married couples
is possible based on information about the relationship to the household head, information on
the household heads’ partner, their marital status, and an age-range plausibility check on the
potential couples (Lengerer, 2005).
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of exogenous controls, including age, age squared, highest educational degree in
three categories and nationality. For further robustness checks, we also control
for potential endogenous variables such as separate indicators for the number of
children in the household and the marital status, i.e. single, married, widowed and
divorced, as well as partner characteristics such as age, highest educational degree
in four categories, nationality, working status and working hours.
3.2 Further data and outcomes
To examine mechanisms, we use a number of supplementary data sets. Table A1
in the Appendix provides an overview of the data used. More details about the
supplementary data are provided as they are introduced in the respective sections.
Besides our three main outcomes of interest, we also examine effects on other
measures of female labor force participation, such as the decision whether to work
at all or the decision to work full-time.
3.3 Empirical strategy
We use different empirical models to estimate labor supply and cultural learning
effects in the aftermath of German reunification. Our baseline model is a simple
difference-in-difference model, which formally reads:
Yirt = β0 + β1 HighInflowr ∗ Post +X
′
irt
β2 + κt + µr + ǫirt (1)
Post is an indicator variable taking the value of one in post reunification periods
and HighInflow
r
is our treatment indicator that is equal to one if a woman i lives
in a region r that received above median inflow from the former GDR after the
fall of the wall.19 κt denote year fixed effects and µr a set of region fixed effects.
We subsequently include state-year fixed effects to non-parametrically allow for
economic shocks at the state level, e.g. changes in government or educational
policies. In addition, we include a vector of exogenous individual controls X ′
irt
.
β2 is allowed to vary in pre- and post-reunification periods. We cluster standard
19We conduct several robustness checks using different treatment definitions, all yielding similar
results (see section 4.2).
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errors ǫirt at the regional level to allow for within-region correlations.
20
In this specification, under common trend assumptions, β1 identifies the average
change in outcomes Yirt between pre- and post reunification periods for high inflow
regions compared to low inflow regions. Under the additional assumption of no
compositional changes, this effect over time can be interpreted as the impact of
immigration of East Germans on outcomes of West Germans.
To study the local dynamic adjustments directly and establish flat pre-trends,
we estimate event study versions of equation (1), by interacting the variable that
measures the inflow right after the fall of the wall, HighInflow
r
, with year-specific
dummies. Effectively, this results in the following specification:









γ2 + κt + µr + uirt (2)
The last pre-treatment indicator (γ1989
1
) is standardized to zero. Thus, γt
1
iden-
tifies the effect on outcome Yirt relative to the year 1989, i.e. the last period before
reunification. This is the vector of coefficients of interest. We also report cumula-
tive effects with respect to all pre-periods to mitigate issues related to using only
one year as a reference point.
As an alternative specification, we use distance to the former border as a source
of exogenous variation for the exposure of East Germans and estimate the following
reduced form model:
Yirt = δ0 + δ1 Distancer ∗ Post +X
′
irt
δ2 + κt + µr + uirt (3)
where Distancer is the distance of the (population weighted) regional centroid
to the next point on the former border (Iron curtain) separating East and West
Germany. As before, κt and µr denote year and region-specific fixed effects and
X ′
irt
is the same set of exogenous controls as in equation (1) and (2). Controls
are allowed to vary in pre-and post reunification periods. We also present results
where we non-parametrically control for economic shocks at the state level by
including state times year fixed effects. Here, δ1 identifies differences in women’
outcomes and gender gaps (within states) as a function of distance in post relative
20In section 4.2, we conduct several sensitivity checks with respect to how we estimate standard
errors.
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to pre-reunification years. To yield internally valid estimates, there should be no
other systematic shocks to female (relative to male) outcomes that are correlated
with distance (within states) to the border of the former GDR and no unobserved
compositional differences across time that vary with distance (within states). Note
that any time-invariant geographic differences are absorbed by the region specific
fixed effects, while year fixed effects control for national trends in women’s labor
supply. In addition, looking at relative hours within households nets out any time-
varying geographical differences that affects men and women similarly.21
4 Results
4.1 Female labor supply
Table 2 reports estimates for equation (1) for all three outcomes that we study
using the Microcensus data for increasingly demanding specifications. The baseline
estimates are reported in columns 1, 4 and 7. Including state year fixed effects
in columns 2, 5 and 8 non-parametrically controls for state-specific unobserved
shocks, e.g. changes in government or educational reforms. In addition, we flexibly
control for a set of individual controls such as age, age squared, highest educational
degree in three categories and nationality, which are allowed to differ in pre- and
post-periods in columns 3, 6 and 9. If unobserved (economic) shocks at the state
level or compositional changes were driving the results, they would differ across
specifications.
The first three columns show little evidence of consistent effects on working
hours for all women. Estimates turn positive but remain insignificant moving from
columns 1 to 3. In contrast, the baseline DiD coefficients indicate that regions with
above median inflow shares after German reunification experience an increase in
working hours of employed women of about 0.9 hours per week and an increase
in working hours of women relative to their cohabiting partner of about 0.05 per-
centage points.
To examine the effect evolution, Figure 4 plots coefficients from equation (2) for
our main outcomes. The estimated coefficients are close to zero and not statistically
21As a robustness check, we also show non-parametric distance gradients by estimating Ybirt =
σ0 + σ1 Post + µr + uirt within each 30 km bin.
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significant in pre-reunification years, indicating that before reunification treated
and control regions exhibit similar trends in outcomes. After reunification, in
panel (b) we find the positive and significant effect on working hours of employed
women which seems to level of at about 1 hour per week (3.2% relative to the
pre-reunification mean). It takes about 6 years for the coefficients to become
statistically significant at the 5% level. Subsequently, they stay roughly constant.
Similarly, panel (c) shows a positive effect on the relative working hours of women
within households, which levels of at about 0.1 percentage points. As before, effects
at the extensive margin of labor supply are only mildly positive, see panel (a).
Table 3 shows δ1 coefficients in equation (3) for our main outcomes. The results
indicate that regions closer to the former east border experienced an increase in
working hours of employed women after German reunification and an increase
relative working hours of women within households. The coefficient in column
(6) of Table 3 indicate that a 50 km increase in proximity to the east border is
associated with an increase in working hours of employed women of about 0.28
hours per week and a 0.25 ppt increase in the share of hours relative to the partner
in the household.22
The findings are consistent with our DiD and event-study estimates, though the
interpretation differs a bit. While the findings in Table 2 and Figure 4 reflect labor
supply responses of West German women due to the presence of East Germans,
distance correlates shown in Table 3 can be interpreted as geographical exposure to
East Germans. Thus, we refrain from interpreting LATE estimates, i.e. re-scaling
our reduced form findings by the first stage depicted in Figure A2, though they
are highly statistical significant.23
Overall, the findings of the different empirical specifications are consistent with
our prior assumption on slow moving cultural learning effects, as reflected by the
labor supply decisions of women at the intensive margin. One interpretation of
the lack of significant effects at the extensive margin is that these also depend on
22This finding holds when differentiation against male outcomes by estimating a triple-
difference regression: We find a strong and significant gradient in distance to the east border for
working hours of employed women and relative working hours within households, while coeffi-
cients for men are relatively flat.
23Appendix Figure A6 shows Post estimates in different distance bins. There are obtained
from regression Ybirt = σ0 + σ1 Post + µr + uirt within each 30 km bin and then plotting σ1
coefficients.
15
the local childcare infrastructure, or identity formation which happens maybe only
once in life, issues which we return to in sections 4.3 and 5.
4.2 Robustness
4.2.1 Treatment definition, identifying East Germans and sample re-
strictions, placebos
Table A3 in the Appendix presents a series of robustness checks in Panels A to C.
Panel A of Table A3 shows results for different functional forms to capture the
inflow of East Germans, either using different cut-offs to define ”high” inflow or
continuous measures. Using a 25% vs 75% instead of the median split generates
larger estimates. Estimates based on continuous measures are also statistically
significant. Our results are thus not sensitive to the functional form for measuring
the inflow of East Germans
Panel B of Table A3 presents results imposing different sample restrictions.
One challenge of our main data set is that respondents are not directly asked if
they grew up in East Germany. Thus, one potential threat to the cultural learning
interpretation would be to misclassify East German women as West Germans.
This would mechanically bias our estimates upwards since East German women
exhibit strikingly different labor market outcomes, even after moving to the western
part of Germany. To mitigate this issue, in our main specification we restrict the
analysis to cohorts born between 1945 and 1970. This ensures that we can best
identify and exclude all East Germans who moved to West Germany by observing
their GDR educational degree (see section B.2 in the Appendix for details). The
downside of using this cohort restriction is that our sample grows older with time.
As expected from section B.2, our estimates are very similar without this cohort
restriction (estimates with column-title ”all cohorts”). The other sample restriction
that we use in panel B is the exclusion of border regions. This is motivated by
the fact that Redding and Sturm (2008) find regions close to the Iron Curtain
experience a decrease in population growth due to the loss of market access after
German division.24 In addition, in 1971 the West German government introduced
a subsidy program (”Zohnenrandfo¨rdergesetz”) for regions within 40 kilometers of
24However, they find no statistically significant effects after German reunification.
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the border (e.g. Seidel and von Ehrlich, 2014). Estimates from this ”no border”
sample are very similar to the baseline. Overall, the results of Panel B confirm
that our findings are robust to different sampling choices.
Finally, in Panel C of Table A3 we estimate placebo regressions with male labor
supply as the outcome variable. Here, we fail to detect significant effects, for all
outcomes. This finding is maybe not surprising given our approach and the findings
of the literature on migration and labor supply.25 Nevertheless, the fact that there
are no effects on males further strengthens our argument that local labor market
trends are unlikely driving our results. Furthermore, in Panel C of Table A3 we
construct an equivalent treatment measure using West-West migration, i.e. mo-
bility within West Germany and equally do not find a significant treatment effect,
suggesting that local demand spillovers that result from an increase in population
density are unlikely to drive our results.
Another concern would be that immigrants start working in services that are
close substitutes of household production (e.g. as caregivers or household help),
thus lowering the prices of these goods (e.g. Cortes, 2008).26 For example, Cortes
and Tessada (2011) show that low skilled immigration increases working hours of
highly-skilled women in the US. This alternative interpretation is very unlikely to
apply to our setting for several reasons. First, East German immigrants are if
anything positively selected and work in similar occupations like West Germans,
and rarely work in the child care sector (about 4 %). Second, we observe larger
effects for lower skilled West German women, who are very unlikely to employ
private child minders. Third, informal child care by child minders is generally not
very common in Germany (e.g. Bu¨chel and Spieß, 2002). Only very few German
households purchase other household services in the market (e.g. Schupp et al.,
2006).
25See discussion of this literature on page 5.
26We show in section 5 that the presence of East Germans lead to an expansion of the child
care infrastructure. Similar to the previous argument, one could argue that the labor supply
responses are driven by West German women now working in child care institutions. However,




Fourth, we carefully assess whether our estimates might simply reflect composi-
tional changes, e.g. due to selective out-migration as a response to the inflow of
East Germans. This concern is particular severe given our long post treatment
period, which we chose to capture slow moving cultural learning effects. In Table
A8 in the Appendix, we examine if the amount of outflow and the age patterns
of outflow in reunified Germany differs by treatment status. While coefficients
are negative, indicating lower outflows for treated regions, these are small and far
from reaching significance. Furthermore, compositional changes might evolve due
to selective in-migration. However, coefficients in Panel B of Table A8 suggest no
difference in the amount and age pattern of immigration from other West German
regions. Again coefficients are negative, indicating lower inflows in our treated
regions.
In addition, we estimate models with a more extensive set of individual controls
such as dummies for the number of children, marital status in four categories
(single, married, widowed, divorced) and partner characteristics (age linear and
squared, education, nationality, working status, working hours)27. Note, that some
of these additional controls might be endogenous to local cultural learning effects,
in particular in the long run. However, they can better control for any potential
compositional changes. Estimated coefficients for our baseline DiD model are
depicted in Table A7 and event versions in Figure A3. They are very similar
across different control specifications. We also assess compositional changes more
directly by replacing the outcomes with the extensive set of control variables and
re-estimate our models. None of these coefficients are statistically significant.28
Further robustness checks In addition, we assess the sensitivity to modeling
time trends. Figure A4 graphically depicts our event-study estimates using differ-
ent trend specifications, i.e. region specific linear time trends and region specific
linear time trends fitted only on pre-unification (1982 - 1989) data. As expected
from observing parallel trends in Figure 4, results are stable using different trend-
27Unfortunately, the Microcensus only contains information on net monthly income. Since
in Germany, couples are subject to an income splitting taxation model, controlling for the net-
income of the partner partly reflect the endogenous earning of the women.
28These additional results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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specifications, with the exception of overall working hours. Note that using unit
specific linear time trends changes the identifying assumption from parallel trends
to one of parallel growth.29
As mentioned in section 3.3, we also assess the sensitivity of inference, i.e. to
how we calculate our standard errors. Table A10 reports standard errors of our
main DiD estimates when clustering standard errors on the higher level of aggre-
gation, which corresponds to the state-level in our setting. In addition, it reports
unclustered standard errors and standard errors that are obtained when aggregat-
ing the data on the regional level and re-estimating our main specification. Note
that we only conduct this exercise without including additional controls because
this would also slightly change our estimated treatment coefficients. Inference re-
mains similar using alternative ways to cluster standard errors. However, when
clustering on the state level, standard errors are larger and only the coefficient
without any additional controls remain significant. We do not regard clustering at
the state level as appropriate due to the small number of states in West Germany
(nine).
Finally, in Appendix Figure A2 estimate effects non-parametrically using 30km
distance bins, moving away from the former border. These plots show clear pat-
terns for working hours of employed women in panels (b) and (c), and that our
results are not driven by particular observations or outliers in particular locations.
4.3 Heterogeneity and further outcomes
This section presents results by different household types. The estimated coeffi-
cients in Table 4 are obtained by stratifying our baseline DiD estimates by highest
educational schooling degree, marital status and age of the youngest child within
the household.30
When stratifying the results by education, it is evident that the results are
primarily driven by women with low and medium levels of education, especially
29There is on ongoing debate whether including unit-specific linear time trends in fixed effects
models is a reasonable thing to do since they might pick up parts of the treatment effect or cause
some spurious correlation in the residual (e.g. Wolfers, 2006).
30As mentioned above, restricting out sample to cohorts born between 1945 to 1970 has the
potential caveat that our sample grows older with time. This is why the stratification by youngest
child is done using all cohorts. For all other results, we report results based on the restricted
sample. Note, however, that the results are very similar without this cohort restriction.
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within households.
Married women exhibit slightly stronger responses, but these differences are
not significant.
The last row of Table 4 splits the effect by the age of the youngest child present
in the household. The estimates in columns 1 to 3 show effects that include the
extensive margin of not working/working at all, and these are larger for women
with small children (0.813 age below three; 0.273 age above six), although these
coefficients as well as their differences are not statistically significant from zero or
each other at conventional levels of statistical significance.31 In contrast, the effects
on female working hours for employed women, both in absolute terms (columns 4
to 6) and relative terms (columns 7 to 9), are clearly driven by women with the
youngest child above the age of three in the household. We believe these women we
least constraint by the local childcare infrastructure. In West Germany, children
above the age of three either attended kindergarden or school, enabling women to
increase working hours at the intensive margin. We believe that working women
with younger children were possibly constrained by the lack of formal childcare,
which we examine directly in Section 5.3 below. Finally, in Figure A7 we present
estimates of equation 2 for other outcomes: Labor force participation, full-time
employment defined as working above 35 hours per week, and full-time employment
of employed women. These findings mirror our results found in our three main
outcomes.
5 Mechanisms
There may be different mechanisms at play that could explain the positive labor
supply responses of West German women. It could be that West German women
simply mimic the behavior of east Germans (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), that
there is some sort of information and cultural norm transmission (Fogli and Veld-
kamp, 2011) through social interactions or that east Germans change the local
infrastructure for families (e.g. child care provision) either through their direct
demand or indirectly through voting outcomes. All of these potential mechanisms
31If taken at face value, the finding that extensive margin effects appear stronger for women
with young children might emerge through changes in identity formation, rather than cultural
learning, which occurs when children are young.
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are likely to reinforce each other over time.
Empirically, it is not possible to net out one single explanation for the observed
effects. However, we can use additional data sets and outcomes to better under-
stand the observed patterns in the data and to provide additional evidence on
cultural learning effects. The additional survey and administrative data used to
examine effects on local cultural norms, East-West friendship and intermarriage as
well as the local child care infrastructure are summarized in Appendix Table A1.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A5 and Table A6.
5.1 Local cultural norms
Studies show that individuals who grew up under the former GDR regime de-
veloped different cultural norms regarding the appropriate role of women, beliefs
about the potential costs of maternal employment for children, and importance
of women’s careers (Campa and Serafinelli, 2019; Lippmann et al., 2019; Bauern-
schuster and Rainer, 2012; Beblo and Go¨rges, 2018).
To empirically examine if cultural norms and beliefs were transmitted to West
Germans, we examine the agreement of West Germans to statements regarding the
appropriate role of women in the family and beliefs about the potential costs of
maternal employment for children and the marriage using data from the General
Social Survey (ALLBUS) (GESIS - Leibniz-Institut fr Sozialwissenschaften, 2018).
We combine the agreement to the single items shown in Figure 2 to a single index by
standardizing each variable (measured on 4-point scale ranging from 1 ”completely
agree” to 4 ”completely disagree”) and then add up each item such that lower
values correspond to less ”traditional” gender attitudes and beliefs about how
maternal employment affects children and the family. In the ALLBUS survey,
these question were first asked in 1982. However, regional identifiers only become
available in 1994. Although we do not have data on norms and beliefs before and
after reunification, we can test whether individuals living in high inflow counties
exhibit less traditional cultural norms after reunification, controlling for a rich set
of covariates including state times year fixed effects.32
32The ALLBUS data has several advantages. First, it directly asks individuals where they were
born and spent their youth, which mitigates the problem of misspecification of East Germans.
Second, it is very rich in socio-economic controls, e.g. we can also control for religion.
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Estimated coefficients in Table 5 are negative and significant, suggesting that
individuals living in high inflow counties in West Germany in post-reunification
periods exhibit less ”traditional” gender attitudes and beliefs about detrimental
effect of maternal employment for children and the family. This holds when con-
trolling for state year fixed effects, capturing state specific shocks and a very rich
set of individual controls. The magnitude amounts to about 7 % of a standard
deviation. The estimated relationship increases with time. Examining hetero-
geneities by gender and individual statements shows that this result is driven by
women who adjust their beliefs about the costs of working for children and families
(first three statements in figure 2), while attitudes toward the appropriate role of
women (last three statements in figure 2) are less affected. Similarly, in Table 5
we find a significant distance gradient after German reunification, indicating that
West Germans adjust their beliefs more strongly if they live living closer to the
former east border.
5.2 Social interactions: friendships and intermarriages
The transmission of cultural norms or information is likely to happen more rapidly
if there is a lot of interaction between local West Germans and individuals who
grew up under the former GDR regime. Since East Germans are observationally
similar to West Germans, i.e. they speak the same language and have similar levels
of education, one would not expect to find a ”clustering” or enclaves of immigrants
as it is common for other immigration groups.
To examine to what extent West Germans interact with people who grew up
under the former GDR regime, we rely on data from the Socio-economic panel
study (GSOEP).33 The GSOEP is an annual household-panel survey that is repre-
sentative of the entire population in Germany (Wagner et al., 2007). We construct
measures of the prevalence of East Germans in the friendship network of men and
women living in West Germany and the share of marriages where one partner is
from East Germany. In particular, we construct two indicators: the share of friends
who come from East Germany and an indicator whether a person states to have
33As an additional robustness check, we also conduct the main analysis based on GSOEP data.
The estimated coefficients are similar; however, due to much smaller sample sizes, they are less
precisely estimated (Table A9).
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at least one friend from East Germany.34
Table 6 shows that in treated regions the share of friends who are originally
from east Germany is significantly higher (about 0.5 percentage points) than in
control regions. In addition, West Germans in treated regions state to have at least
one friend who is originally from East Germany with a 1 percentage point higher
probability. These coefficients are large given the overall mean of about 3 % and
5 %, respectively. Intermarriages rates is also higher in treated regions (by about
0.2 percentage points), though the coefficients are not statistically significant.35
Examining the coefficients over time shows that while treated and control regions
exhibit the same friendship outcomes in 1996 (first year available), the coefficient
subsequently increases to 1.2 percentage points and 3 percentage points in 2016,
respectively. Further analysis shows that the coefficient is significantly larger for
working individuals and is increasing with years of education, which might indicate
that some of the interaction between East and West Germans happens at the
workplace.
To sum up, friendships and intermarriages between East and West Germans
remained at a low level in the first decade following German reunification. However,
it increased substantially in high inflow regions in the years that followed.
5.3 The local child care infrastructure
As described in section 2, in East Germany almost all children were in formal
childcare from a rather early age. In West Germany, on the other hand, child
care places36 for young children or after-school care for school-age children were
very rare (see section 2 for more details on the institutional setting). Most child
care for children under the age of three was provided informally by the mothers,
grandparents or other family members and friends. Administrative data on the
number of children in publicly funded child care on the county level is available
34This information is derived from a question on friendship networks that is available in the
years 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016. Respondents are asked to think of three friends or relatives
(excluding people living in the same household) with whom they go out with or meet regularly.
35Note that when examining the group of East Germans who live in West Germany directly,
we observe an equivalent pattern.
36In Germany - in contrast to other industrialized countries - about 98% of all child care places
are publicly funded and provided by the municipalities themselves or by non-profit organizations,
i.e. churches or welfare organizations (e.g. ?). The administration in Germany is up to the states
and counties.
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starting in 1986.37 We construct childcare ratios separately for children under the
age of three and for children aged three and above (all-day child care). Childcare
ratios are defined as the fraction of children using subsidized formal child care in
the respective age group.38
Figure 5 plots the estimated treatment effect on child care attendance.39 Aver-
age effects are reported in Appendix Table A11. It is evident that in regions with
above median inflow formal child care supply for under three year olds expanded at
a much faster pace than in other regions. By 2015 the coefficient amounts to about
2.5 percentage points (7 % relative to the mean in 2015). The coefficients averaged
over all years corresponds to 1.2 percentage points (see Table A11). Interestingly,
child care ratios do not increase right away, though in the administrative data set
we cannot differentiate between the children of east and west Germans. Thus,
one might have expected an immediate increase caused by the direct demand of
east Germans themselves. One explanation why it takes so long for the supply to
respond to the demand is that the expansion of institutionalized care for children
under the age of three was only promoted on the national level in 2005 and 2008,
when the government passed two laws (and provided money) to expand child care
provision for this age group. Similarly, the estimated coefficient for the fraction
of children above the age of three (until school entry) in all-day formal child care
amounts to about 3 percentage points (11 % relative to the overall mean). In
Appendix Table A11, we also report reduced form estimates using distance to the
former east border as a measure of exposure to East Germans.40 Coefficients are
highly statistically significant and robust across different specifications.
Overall, our empirical exercise suggests that there were substantial spillover
37Until 2002 this dataset was collected in four-year intervals and contained information on
the number of approved child care slots. Starting in 2007 the actual number of children in
publicly funded child care is provided anually. Due to severe child care shortages, the change in
definition does not cause a discontinuity in the data. The data from 1986 is obtained from the
Familien-Atlas of the Deutsches Jugendinstitut (1993).
38It would also be interesting to examine the impact on after school care. However, due to
data availability and the expansion of all-day schooling (Ganztagsschulausbau), it is not possible
to construct a consistent measure of after school care ratios on the county level over time.
39Since in 1986, there are some missings in the data, we also show estimates when using 1994
as a baseline.
40Unfortunately, we have no information on full-day child care ratios before reunification. Thus
we report distance coefficient based on equation 3 but without the post interaction. For children
under the age of three, we have one pre-treatment year (1986). In this year, distance is not
correlated with child care ratios (p = 0.311).
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effects on the childcare infrastructure that potentially amplified or even triggered
some of the labor supply responses of women that we see in the data.
6 Concluding remarks
We exploit the unique natural experiment of German reunification to study the
local evolution of social norms and behavior. We show that large migration in-
flows of individuals with different social norms and beliefs about how maternal
employment affects children and the family can have substantial spillovers effects
on West German families, reflected in intensive margin of labor supply and within
household division of paid work. We find these effects best accommodated by
models of social learning and endogenous child care infrastructure. We support
this interpretation by providing direct evidence on the evolution of stated beliefs
about detrimental effects of working women for children and the family, local social
interaction between East and West Germans and the local expansion of publicly
funded child care.
We find these effects best accommodated by models of cultural learning and
endogenous childcare infrastructure. We support this interpretation by provid-
ing direct evidence on the evolution of stated beliefs and attitudes, local social
interaction between East and West Germans and the evolution of formal child
care provision. In contrast, we find very limited evidence for effects at the exten-
sive margin of labor supply, suggesting that slow-moving changes in local cultural
norms cannot easily affect identity formation. Here, we find some evidence that
mothers of very young children, for whom identities might still be malleable, react
at the extensive margin. We believe the potential interplay of cultural learning
and identity formation presents an exciting route for future work.
We argued that the historical setting that we study is uniquely suited to better
understand the impact of immigrants on local cultural norms. But what does this
imply for external validity? The immigrants that we study have different cultural
norms, but speak the same language; they also have accredited educational degrees,
and are fairly similar in many other respects. The effects of immigration working
through local social interaction are likely to take longer to materialize whenever
immigrants integrate less well with the native population. As a result, different
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and less integrated immigrants are less likely to immediately affect the cultural
norms of natives through the learning channel and might not even do so in the
second generation. However, the absence of direct immigrant-native interaction
does not mean that such less integrated immigrants have no impact on natives
at all. Instead, they might have an effect via changes in the local infrastructure,
which does not depend on direct immigrant-native interaction.
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Figures and Tables






1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
East Germany West Germany
Notes: The figure shows labor force participation rates of women aged 15 - 65 in East and West
Germany over time. The vertical line indicates German reunification in 1989.
Sources: Statistisches Amt der DDR (1996-1990), Statistisches Bundesamt (2017), MZ (1991 -
2015), own calculation.
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A married women should turn a job down if  only a limited number of jobs is available andher husband is able to make a living for the family
West Germany East Germany
Source: The figure shows the fraction of individuals agreeing to a certain statement by East
and West Germans in 1991.
Notes: ALLBUS 1991, own calculation
32
Figure 3: Immigration from East to West Germany
(a) Number of immigrants over time
(b) Inflows in 1990-1991
Notes: The figures plots (a) the number of immigrants from East to West Germany over time.
The vertical lines indicate the construction of the wall in 1961 and the fall of the wall in 1989;
(b) the inflow from East Germany as share of the local county-level population in 1990.
Source: BBSR (2017), German Statistical Offices, own calculation.
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Figure 4: Event analysis
(a) Working hours of women
(b) Working hours of employed women
(c) Working hours within households
Notes: The figures plots the estimated γ1 coefficients from equation (2) and corresponding 95%
confidence intervals.
Source: MZ 1982-2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation.
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Figure 5: Formal child care provision for children below age three
Notes: The figures plots the estimated γ1 coefficients from equation (2) and corresponding 95%
confidence intervals using 1986 and 1994 as baselevels.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2017), BBSR (2017)
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Table 1: MZ descriptives statistics
Mean Std. Dev. N
Female labor market outcomes
Working hours / week 22.74 17.39 1373594
Working hours / week of employed women 30.44 13.05 1026126
Relative working hours within household 0.38 0.13 648386
Individual controls
Age 39.99 8.20 1438913
Degree from basic school track (Hauptschule) 0.43 0.49 1438913
Degree from middle school track (Realschule) 0.32 0.47 1438913
Degree from high school track (Abitur) 0.25 0.43 1438913
Foreign nationality 0.07 0.25 1438913
Individual potentially endogenous controls
Married 0.71 0.45 1438913
Divorced 0.09 0.29 1438913
Widowed 0.02 0.13 1438913
Single 0.18 0.39 1438913
No children in household 0.48 0.50 1438913
1 child in household 0.24 0.43 1438913
2 children in household 0.21 0.41 1438913
3 children in household 0.05 0.22 1438913
4 children in household 0.01 0.10 1438913
5 or more children in household 0.00 0.05 1438913
Partner controls
Age 43.69 9.00 1035538
Degree from basic school track (Hauptschule) 0.50 0.50 1025608
Degree from middle school track (Realschule) 0.21 0.41 1025551
Degree from high school track (Abitur) 0.28 0.45 1025577
Foreign nationality 0.07 0.26 1035516
Working hours / week 39.78 13.47 1002440
Note: The sample includes all women aged 25 - 55 with non-missing information
on individual controls, who are currently living in west Germany and do not
have an east German educational degree.
Source: MZ 1982-2015, own calculation
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Table 2: The labor supply effect of exposure to East Germans
Dependent variable
Working hours Working hours Relative working hours
of women of employed women within households
Mean of dep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
before reunification 21.62 21.62 21.62 34.78 34.78 34.78 0.42 0.42 0.42
DiD coefficient -0.167 0.443 0.343 0.919*** 0.984*** 0.865*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.299) (0.334) (0.308) (0.282) (0.357) (0.300) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 1,373,594 1,373,594 1,373,594 1,026,126 1,026,126 1,026,126 648,386 648,386 648,386
Adj. R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.037 0.032 0.032 0.054 0.026 0.026 0.046
Note: Difference-in-difference coefficients from equation (1). For set of individual controls see Table 1. * 10% level of
significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: MZ 1982-2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation.
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Table 3: The labor supply effect of exposure to East Germans: Distance specification
Dependent variable
Working hours Working hours Relative working hours
of women of employed women within households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Distance ∗ Post 0.00313 -0.00343 -0.00263 -0.00590** -0.00581** -0.00561** -0.00007*** -0.00005*** -0.00005***
(0.00255) (0.00230) (0.00223) (0.00247) (0.00253) (0.00230) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 1,143,815 1,143,815 1,143,815 850,400 850,400 850,400 537,787 537,787 537,787
Note: Reduced form coefficients from equation (3). For set of individual controls see Table 1. * 10% level of significance, **
5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: MZ 1982-2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation.
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Table 4: Difference-in-Differences estimates: Heterogeneity
Working hours Working hours Relative working hours
of women of employed women within households
Stratified by (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
low middle high low middle high low middle high
Education 0.271 0.749** 0.535 1.274*** 0.704*** 0.088 0.009*** 0.004* 0.000
(0.274) (0.319) (0.491) (0.368) (0.242) (0.344) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
no yes no yes no yes
Married 0.234 0.431 0.614** 0.974*** 0.006* 0.006***
(0.44144) (0.33021) (0.30168) (0.34234) (0.00295) (0.00217)
<3 [3,6] >6 <3 [3,6] >6 <3 [3,6] >6
Age of youngest child 0.813 0.667 0.273 0.991* 1.629*** 1.465*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.595) (0.505) (0.491) (0.540) (0.579) (0.515) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Note: Difference-in-difference coefficients from equation (1) assessing heterogenous effects by highest schooling degree, mari-
tial status and age of the youngest child. * 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: MZ 1982 - 2015, BBSR 2017, own calculation.
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Table 5: Cultural norms and beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HighInflow -0.0579** -0.0611** -0.0626**
(-2.02) (-2.13) (-2.45)
Distance to east border 0.000459** 0.000492**
(2.07) (2.40)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual controls ✓ ✓
Observations 6,009 6,009 6,009 6,009 6,009
Adj. R-squared 0.0521 0.0527 0.1580 0.0456 0.1580
Note: All estimates include year fixed effects. The individual controls in-
clude age, age squared, highest schooling degree in three categories, reli-
gion and city size in three categories. Standard errors clustered at regional
level. T-statistics in parenthesis. * 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of
significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: Source: ALLBUS 2000-2016, BBSR (2017), own calculation.
Table 6: Friendships and intermarriages in West Germany
Share friends At least one friend Partner
from East Germany from East Germany from East Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of dep. variable 0.026 0.026 0.052 0.052 0.003 0.003
HighInflow 0.005* 0.005** 0.010** 0.010** 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Ind. controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 51,720 51,720 51,720 51,720 238,797 238,797
adj. R-squared 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.004
Note: All estimated include year fixed effects. Covariates are depicted in Table A5. Friend-
ship information is available every fifth year starting in 1996. Standard errors clustered
at regional level. 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of
significance.
Source: SOEP 1984-2016, BBSR (2017), own calculation
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Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Child care ratios 1950 - 2015














1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
East Germany West Germany
Notes: The figure shows the fraction of children in different age groups being cared for in
formal child care in East and West Germany over time. For West Germany there is no data
available before 1965. The vertical line indicates German reunification in 1989.
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt (2018), BMFSFJ (1994), Winkler (1990)
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Figure A2: Immigration from East and West Germany by distance to East border
(a) From East (b) From East (within states)
(c) From West (d) From West (within states)
Notes: The size of the bubbles reflect the population size of each county. Distance is measured
as the distance of the county’s centroid to the nearest border point. Inflows shares are defined
as inflow relative to the population in each county. (b) and (d) show inflow shares using only
within state variation, i.e. relative to the state mean. Linear regression lines are shown without
and with the adjustment by observable county characteristics (see Table A2 for details). Slope
coefficients in (a) -.0039 (t = −10.57) , in Panel (b) -.0039 (t = −12.00) , in Panel (c) .0022
(t = 1.22), and in Panel (d) .0010 (t = 0.68).
Source: BBSR (2017), own calculations
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Figure A3: Event analysis - controls
(a) Working hours
(b) Working hours of employed women
(c) Working hours gap within households
Notes: The figures plots the estimated γ1 coefficients from equation (2) and corresponding 95%
confidence intervals using different sets of control variables. See Table 1 for details.
Source: MZ 1982-2015, own calculation.
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Figure A4: Event analysis - trend specification
(a) Working hours
(b) Working hours of employed women
(c) Working hours within households
Notes: The figures plots the estimated γ1 coefficients from equation (2) and corresponding 95%
confidence intervals using different regional trend specifications. Baseline results include no
regional trends, linear trends are fitted using all available time periods, and linear pre-trends
are estimated using pre-reunification data only.
Source: Microcensus 1982-2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation.44
Figure A5: Event analysis - all pre-periods as baseline
(a) Working hours
(b) Working hours of employed women
(c) Working hours within households
Notes: The figures plots the estimated effects when using the average of all pre-periods in
equation (2) as a reference point and corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Microcensus 1982-2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation.
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Figure A6: Distance gradients
(a) Working hours
(b) Working hours of employed women
(c) Working hours within households






Post + µr + uirt. The size of the bubbles reflect the number of observations in
each bin. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. The solid lines indicate the average
Post estimate when using the entire sample, i.e. the average increase (decline) in outcomes in
pre- relative to post-reunification periods. The dashed lines are linear fits to the estimated σ1
coefficients. The right hand panel differentiates in addition against regional male outcomes, i.e.





Post ∗ Female + σb
2
Female + µr + uirt.
Source: Microcensus 1982-2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation.
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Figure A7: Event analysis - other outcomes
(a) Labor force participation
(b) Full-time employment
(c) Full-time employment of employed women
Notes: The figures plots the estimated γ1 coefficients from equation (2) and corresponding 95%
confidence intervals for alternative outcomes.
Source: Microcensus 1982-2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation.
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Table A1: Overview over different datasets
Data set Access Type Main variables Years
Migration statistics Sonderaus- admin Inflow from East 1991 - 2015
wertung Germany by age groups
Microcensus on-site use admin Women’s labor supply 1982, 1985, 1987, 1989,
Socio-economic 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997,
characteristics 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005,
2007, 2008, 2010, 2012,
2013, 2015
Socio-economic Panel (on-site use) survey East Germans in 1985 - 2015
Study (SOEP) friendship network and
intermarriage rates
German General Social on-site use survey Social norm and beliefs 2000, 2004, 2008,
Survey (ALLBUS) 2012, 2016
Population statistics open access admin Population size 1990 - 2015
by age
Child care statistics open access admin Child care ratios for 1986, 1994, 1998, 2002,
different age groups 2007 - 2015
Regionaldatenbank open access admin Various county charact. 1986, 1987, 1989
DJI mainly based on
Population Census and
Occupation Census
Note: Data on district-level migration statistics was purchased from the Federal Statistical office for
use in this project. Microcensus (MZ) data: The MZ data that includes regional identifier is ac-
cessible on-site (https://www.forschungsdatenzentrum.de/en/household/microcensus) through any
of the statistical offices’ Secure Data Centers. Researchers are also required to sign a special usage
agreement and output is cleared by the statistics office to ensure anonymity. ALLBUS data: The
datasets used for our analysis contain detailed regional information and are accessible at the Se-
cure Data Center (www.gesis.org/en/sdc) of the GESIS Data Archive for Social Sciences in Cologne
Germany. Researchers are required to sign a special usage agreement and to work within an individ-
ually tailored secure virtual workspace. SOEP Data: the SOEP data including regional itentifiers
is available to resarchers, after signing a special usage agreement, on-site at the DIW Berlin.
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Table A2: Can county characteristics in 1987 predict migration after fall of wall?
High inflow from High inflow from
East Germany West Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Industry sector in 1987: Share of employees working in ...
Agriculture and forestry 0.717* 0.142 -2.343*** -2.281***
(0.401) (0.387) (0.381) (0.358)
Trade 0.530 -0.100 -2.053*** 0.457
(0.768) (0.521) (0.760) (0.552)
Manufacturing 2.961 2.702* -11.315***-7.698***
(1.960) (1.610) (1.861) (1.527)
Energy, water supply and mining -0.291 -0.069 -0.755*** -0.273
(0.212) (0.201) (0.208) (0.197)
Firm structure in 1987: Share of employees working in ...
Small firms (2 - 19 employees) 1.471 0.601 -1.497* -3.398***
(0.908) (0.991) (0.907) (0.905)
Large firms (≥ 100 employees) -0.069 -0.033 0.225*** 0.334***
(0.060) (0.068) (0.058) (0.059)
Religion in 1987:
Christian religion -0.175 0.790 -3.371*** -4.806***
(0.757) (0.676) (0.733) (0.606)
Other / no religion 0.423 -0.910 3.558*** 4.808***
(0.747) (0.663) (0.719) (0.584)
Voting outcomes in 1989:
Vote share Christian Democratic Union 0.398 0.573 -5.168*** -6.311***
(0.886) (0.988) (0.837) (0.788)
Vote share Social Democratic Party 0.327 0.841 0.051 0.566
(0.885) (0.656) (0.885) (0.610)
Vote share Greens -0.165 -0.477 1.860*** 2.480***
(0.315) (0.343) (0.297) (0.284)
Vote share Free Democratic Party -0.077 0.049 0.519*** 0.632***
(0.130) (0.093) (0.126) (0.089)
Formal child care and expenditures in 1986:
Child care ratio (0–2 year olds) 0.070 -0.002 0.629*** 0.722***
(0.147) (0.164) (0.142) (0.157)
Child care ratio (3–6 year olds) -2.068 4.216** 5.345** 3.360**
(2.410) (1.683) (2.394) (1.619)
Continued on next page
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High inflow from High inflow from
East Germany West Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After-school care ratio (6–9 year olds) -0.725 -0.844 2.960*** 3.595***
(0.500) (0.556) (0.473) (0.508)
Child and youth welfare expenditures -0.155 -0.190 0.594*** 0.703***
(0.113) (0.131) (0.109) (0.118)
Population composition in 1987:
Share singles 1.591 -0.171 -7.764*** -2.275*
(1.915) (1.279) (1.866) (1.343)
Share married 2.575 1.218 -10.795***-3.744**
(2.414) (1.554) (2.340) (1.650)
Share divorces 0.014 -0.046 0.118 0.803***
(0.205) (0.161) (0.205) (0.161)
Share foreigners -0.477 -0.433 0.091 1.197***
(0.419) (0.400) (0.420) (0.403)
Share single households -0.572 -1.085 5.964*** 7.365***
(0.872) (0.979) (0.803) (0.838)
Share households ≥ 4 person 1.597 0.700 -8.875*** -6.622***
(1.279) (1.101) (1.181) (1.006)
Housing in 1987:
Average rent (per m2 in DM) -0.509 -0.471** 0.476 0.864***
(0.348) (0.206) (0.349) (0.176)
Average number of rooms per person 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.044*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Female labor supply in 1987:
Share female employees 1.067*** 0.388 1.668*** 1.218***
(0.349) (0.403) (0.341) (0.365)
Share of women working part-time 0.705* 0.471 0.174 0.478
(0.425) (0.359) (0.426) (0.348)
Share of women working as family worker 0.484 0.297 -1.437*** -2.263***
(0.324) (0.359) (0.315) (0.314)
Distance to former East boarder:
Distance (in km) -64.034***-55.719*** -0.067 8.384
(8.284) (7.822) (9.035) (8.211)
Observations 316 316 316 316
Notes: Each coefficient is obtained from a separate regression. East/West inflows are
normalized for comparisons between inflows from East and from West Germany. Column (2)
and column (4) include state fixed effects. Source: Census 1987 based on DJI Regional
Database (1993), BBSR 2017, own calculation.
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Table A3: Difference-in-Differences estimates: Robustness and sensitivity checks
Panel A: treatment definition Working hours Working hours Relative working hours
of women of employed women within households
25 vs. 75 continuous 25 vs. 75 continuous 25 vs. 75 continuous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiD coefficient 0.721 0.287 2.589*** 1.721*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.672) (0.505) (0.300) (0.445) (0.002) (0.003)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 690,896 1,373,594 507,466 1,026,126 316,424 648,386
Panel B: sample restrictions Working hours Working hours Relative working hours
of women of employed women within households
all cohorts no boarder all cohorts no boarder all cohorts no boarder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiD coefficient -0.044 0.494 1.013*** 0.996*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.380) (0.329) (0.355) (0.285) (0.002) (0.002)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 1,855,582 1,204,709 1,343,695 896,884 824,547 569,367
Panel C: placebos Working hours Working hours Relative working hours
of women of employed women within households
male west-west male west-west west-west
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DiD coefficient 0.289 -0.216 0.160 0.114 0.001
(0.239) (0.198) (0.122) (0.115) (0.001)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 1,375,725 1,375,725 1,296,065 1,296,065 648,386
Note: Difference-in-difference coefficients from equation (1) using different treatment definitions in Panel A, dif-
ferent sample restrictions in Panel B and placebo outcome and treatment indicator in Panel C. For set of indi-
vidual controls see Table 1. * 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: Microcensus 1982-2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation.
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Table A4: Microcensus descriptives statistics - East German
women in West Germany
Mean Std. Dev. N
Female labor market outcomes
Working hours 26.585 15.837 17,859
Working hours of employed women 31.624 11.789 15,013
Relative working hours within household 0.405 0.121 9,948
Individual controls
Age 41.100 7.874 18,902
Foreign nationality 0.019 0.135 18,902
Individual potentially endogenous controls
Married 0.701 0.458 18,902
Divorced 0.137 0.344 18,902
Widowed 0.016 0.125 18,902
Single 0.145 0.353 18,902
No children in household 0.524 0.499 18,902
1 child in household 0.263 0.440 18,902
2 children in household 0.172 0.377 18,902
3 children in household 0.034 0.182 18,902
4 children in household 0.006 0.075 18,902
5 or more children in household 0.002 0.040 18,902
Note: The sample includes all women aged 25 - 55 with non-missing infor-
mation on individual controls, who are currently living in west Germany
and have an east German educational degree.
Source: MZ 1982-2015, own calculation
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Table A5: SOEP descriptives statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Friendship network:
Share friends from East Germany 0.03 0.13 0.00 1.00 52293
At least one friend East Germany 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 52293
Partner from East Germany 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 242369
Covariates:
Female 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 242369
Age 42.73 15.09 14.00 92.00 242369
Years of education 11.57 2.52 7.00 18.00 242369
< 20,000 Inhabitants 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 242369
20,000–100,000 Inhabitants 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 242369
≥ 100,000 Inhabitants 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 242369
Protestant 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 242369
Catholic 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 242369
Other religion 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 242369
No religion 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 242369
Female labor market outcomes (replication):
Working hours 15.71 16.45 0.00 80.00 99166
Working hours of employed women 30.62 13.56 0.10 99.90 65542
Relative working hours within household 0.40 0.15 0.00 0.99 48686
Note: The sample includes all individuals with non-missing information on friendship net-
work, who are currently living in west Germany and did not live in east Germany in
1989. The replication sample is restricted to women aged between 25 and 55. Descriptive
statistics are weighted using provided survey weights.
Source: SOEP 1984 - 2017, own calculation
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Table A6: ALLBUS descriptives statistics
Mean Std. Dev. N
Social norms and beliefs:
Index 0.00 (0.776) 6,009
Norm 1 1.630 (0.848) 6,009
Norm 2 2.471 (0.898) 6,009
Norm 3 2.292 (1.029) 6,009
Covariates:
Female 0.513 (0.500) 6,009
Age 48.422 (17.175) 6,009
Primary Education 0.145 (0.353) 6,009
Secondary Education 0.513 (0.500) 6,009
Tertiary Education 0.342 (0.474) 6,009
Protestant 0.418 (0.493) 6,009
Catholic 0.402 (0.490) 6,009
Other Religion 0.030 (0.170) 6,009
No Religion 0.000 (0.000) 6,009
< 20,000 Inhabitants 0.610 (0.488) 6,009
20,000-100,000 Inhabitants 0.101 (0.301) 6,009
> 100,000 Inhabitants 0.289 (0.454) 6,009
Note: The sample includes all individuals with non-missing
information, who are currently living in west Germany and
did not spend their youth in east Germany.
Source: Gesis (2018), own calculation
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Table A7: Difference-in-Differences estimates: Controls
Dependent variable
Working hours Working hours Relative working hours
of women of employed women within households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DiD coefficient 0.343 0.403 0.603 0.865*** 0.912** 1.062*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.308) (0.355) (0.391) (0.299) (0.357) (0.368) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. exog. controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. endog. controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Partner endog. controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 1,373,594 1,373,594 985,410 1,026,126 1,026,126 693,520 648,386 648,386 643,503
Note: Difference-in-difference coefficients from equation 1 using different vectors of controls. For the different set of individ-
ual controls see Table 1. * 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: MZ 1982 - 2015, BBSR 2017, own calculation
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Table A8: Compositional changes - outflows and inflows
Panel A: outflow in other west regions stratified by age groups
overall [0,17] [18,24] [25,29] [30,49] [50,64] ≥65
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean of dep. variable 27941 4279 5639 5184 9257 2075 1507
HighInflow -4865 -654 -713 -1040 -1906 -353 -198
(4933) (721) (802) (900) (1873) (423) (276)
Observations 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728
Adj. R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.017 0.013 0.008 0.006
Panel B: inflow from other west regions stratified by age groups
overall [0,17] [18,24] [25,29] [30,49] [50,64] ≥65
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean of dep. variable 27387 4226 5517 5056 9069 2038 1482
HighInflow -845 -947 -918 -1961 -356 -194 -5220
(651) (946) (1044) (1859) (343) (224) (4996)
Observations 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728
Adj. R-squared 0.021 0.012 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.014
Note: Outflow (number of individuals) in other west German regions (Panel A) and inflow (num-
ber of individuals) from other west German regions (Panel B) of treated relative to control re-
gions in post re-unification years (1991 - 2015). Regressions control for year fixed effects. * 10%
level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: BBSR 2017, own calculation
Table A9: SOEP - replication
Dependent variable
Working hours Working hours Relative working hours
of women of employed women within households
Mean of dep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
before reunification 15.66 15.66 15.66 32.29 32.29 32.29 0.402 0.402 0.402
DiD coefficient -0.952 0.007 -0.324 0.966 0.649 0.617 0.009 0.008 0.009
(0.647) (0.768) (0.721) (0.720) (0.904) (0.889) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 102259 102259 102259 66961 66961 66961 49893 49893 49893
Adj. R-squared 0.018 0.025 0.099 0.024 0.026 0.043 0.016 0.022 0.029
Note: Difference-in-difference coefficients from equation (1). For set of individual controls see Table A5. *
10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: SOEP 1984-2017, BBSR (2017), own calculation
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Table A10: Main difference-in-difference - inference
Dependent variable
Working hours Working hours Relative working hours
of women of employed women within households
Mean of dep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
before reunification 21.62 21.62 21.62 34.78 34.78 34.78 0.42 0.42 0.42
DiD coefficient -0.167 0.443 0.343 0.919 0.984 0.865 0.008 0.006 0.005
Clustering of se
Ror level (0.299) (0.334) (0.308) (0.282)*** (0.357)*** (0.300)*** (0.002)***(0.002)***(0.002)***
State level (0.533) (0.512) (0.457) (0.423)* (0.618) (0.544) (0.003)** (0.004) (0.003)
No clustering (0.090)* (0.112)*** (0.111)*** (0.072)*** (0.092)*** (0.091)*** (0.001)***(0.001)***(0.001)***
Aggregated data (0.308) (0.280)*** (0.002)***
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 1,373,594 1,373,594 1,373,594 1,026,126 1,026,126 1,026,126 648,386 648,386 643,503
Note: Difference-in-difference coefficients from equation (1) using different levels and methods to cluster standard errors.
For set of individual controls see Table 1. * 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: MZ 1982 - 2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation
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Table A11: Formal child care provision
Panel A: under 3 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of dep. variable in 1986 1.438 1.438 1.395 1.438 1.438 1.395
HighInflow 1.264** 1.266** 1.014***
(0.493) (0.499) (0.344)
Distance to East boarder -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Pre-treat county char. ✓ ✓
Observations 3,785 3,785 3,713 3,785 3,785 3,713
Adj. R-squared 0.814 0.822 0.874 0.798 0.835 0.901
Panel B: full-day care over 3 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of dep. variable 27.076 27.076 26.827 27.076 27.076 26.827
HighInflow 3.135** 3.135** 3.647***
(1.315) (1.328) (0.912)
Distance to East boarder -0.018** -0.032*** -0.045***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
State x year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Pre-treat county char. ✓ ✓
Observations 2,219 2,219 2,177 2,275 2,275 2,177
Adj. R-squared 0.470 0.467 0.785 0.096 0.473 0.792
Note: All estimates include state and year fixed effects. Columns (3) and (6) include the rich set
of pre-treatment county characteristics shown in Table A2. Standard errors clustered at regional
level. * 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance.
Source: Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2017), Familien-Atlas I (1993), BBSR (2017)
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Appendix B: Context and measurement error
B.1 Detailled institutional context
B.1.1 East and West Germany before reunification
Women in the labor market The socialistic regime in the former GDR promoted
female qualified employment for several reasons (e.g. Trappe, 1996, 2014; Behrend, 1990). First,
the government of the GDR was committed to the socialist idea of equality, in particular with
respect to gender. The constitution of the former GDR established equal legal and political rights
of women and men already in 1949, though women’s emancipation was primarily focused on labor
market integration and only later on educational attainment. Thereby, full-time employment was
propagandized as the moral duty of women. Second, there was an economic need to integrate
women in the labor force due in the aftermath of World War II and the resulting need to
reconstruct. The demand for labor was further intensified by the big wave of outmigration
between 1949 and the construction of the wall in 1961; about 2.7 million (14 % of the 1949
population) left the GDR in that time window. In addition, families faced strong economic
incentives to live the full-time-dual-earner model, i.e. they were economically dependent on two
full incomes to make a living.
Despite the propagandized equality of sexes in terms of intensive and extensive margin labor
force participation, the labor market in the former GDR remained segregated by gender, both
with respect to occupation but also within occupations, e.g. leadership positions were still pri-
marily held by men (e.g. Winkler, 1990; Langenhan and Roß, 1999; Trappe, 2014). Regarding
non-paid work, e.g. housework or child rearing, the division between sexes remained fairly ”tra-
ditional”. For example, based on data from time use surveys in the former GDR, which were
conducted every 5 years starting in 1974, it is evident that, although women between the age of
16 and 65 provided only about 1 hour per day less paid work than men (including weekends),
the time devoted to housework was about three times higher than men’s in 1974. However, it
decreased substantially through 1990 (to about double than men). In addition, it was primarily
women who devoted time to caring for the children (e.g. Priller, 1993).
In West Germany, on the other hand, policies and social norms set strong incentives for people
to live within traditional role patterns, i.e. the traditional ”breadwinner and non-employed
housewife” model (e.g. Wippermann, 2015). Gender equality by law was only established in
1958. Until 1977, a married women was, by law, only allowed to work if she did not neglect
her domestic responsibilities and the husband had the sole right to decide on family issues. The
labor force participation of women remained rather low until the 1990s. Women usually either
stayed at home after they had children or entered part-time employment after an extended break.
Labor force participation of women and men (overall and with children)is depicted in Figure B1,
working hours in Figure B2, and full-time employment in B3.
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Publicly funded child care and other family policies In order to improve
reconciliation of work and family life, in the former GDR the provision of publicly funded child
care was massively expanded starting in the 60’s (Figure A1). Nursery schools (Krippen) for
children under the age of three, kindergartens for children above age three until school start
(Kindergarten) and after-school care (Hort) for primary school aged children were available
almost universally, with no fees. Nursery schools were under the authority of the Ministry of
Health (Ministerium fu¨r Gesundheitswesen) and mainly provided by public providers (only a
small fraction was provided by companies and churches). Kindergartens and after-school care
was organized by the Ministry of Education (Ministerium fu¨r Volksbildung). By 1989, about 80
% of children under the age of three, more than 95 % of children above the age of three (see
also figure A1) and 85 % of primary-school-aged children attended after-school care. In urban
regions, the respective shares were almost 100 % (e.g. Statistisches Amt der DDR, 1990).
Formal child care was propagandized as more professional and of better quality than infor-
mal care provided by friends or grandparents (e.g. Konrad, 2012). The structural quality was
evaluated and improved constantly, e.g. the child-teacher ratio for children above the age of three
was reduced from about 16:1 in 1955 to 10:1 in 1988 (e.g. Statistisches Amt der DDR, 1990). It
was characterized by long opening hours (from 6 am to 7 pm from Monday to Friday), a fixed
curriculum (Bildungs- und Erziehungsplan) and provided meals. Up to 10 % (in 1960) of the
slots for children were provided in so called Dauerheime or Wochenkrippen - institutions where
children remained during the whole week (Monday-Friday) without going home. Other family
policies that sought to increase the reconciliation of work and family life and support families
in general were gradually expanded, e.g. maternity leave policies became more generous, there
were housing subsidies for families with children, and it became prohibited to dismiss pregnant
women and women with small children (e.g. Obertreis, 1986).
In West Germany on the hand, there was hardly any provision of publicly funded child care for
children under the age of three and school-aged children before reunification, with the exception
of West Berlin. In 1990, almost 30 % of available child care places in West Germany were
provided in West Berlin, 20 % of children younger than three attended publicly funded child care
and 30 % were enrolled in after-school programs. In our analysis, we exclude West Berlin. The
fraction of children attending publicly funded child care remained below 2 % until 1998 and only
about 5 % of elementary school-aged children in West Germany attended after-school programs
before 1989. Most child care was provided informally be the mother, grandparents or friends
(e.g. Bu¨chel and Spieß, 2002; ?). Other family policies, including the tax system and maternal
leave regulations, also promoted the traditional division of work within households. There was
a heated public, political and scientific debate (e.g. Schu¨tze, 1986; Fthenakis, 1989) about the
consequences of maternal employment and formal child care (often called Fremdbetreuung - an
innately negative term for formal care) for children and marriage.
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B.1.2 East and West Germany after reunification
Since reunification, female labor force participation in West Germany increased strongly, though
large regional variations persist. By 2015, almost 84 % of women in West Germany participated
in the labor force, compared to only 63 % in 1989 (Figure B1). The increase in labor force
participation was even stronger for mothers, i.e. from 52 % in 1989 to 78 % in 2015. However,
as shown in figure B2, the increase in average weekly hours worked by women (and mothers)
was only about 5 hours, for women in employment it decreased from around 33 hours to 30
working hours per week (for mothers from 32 to 27 hours). Similarly, in figure B3, the share of
women (mothers) working full-time decreased from around 62 % in 1989 to about 47 % in 2015
(for mothers from 48 % to 29 %). This indicates that in Germany (in contrast to other OECD
countries) the change in labor supply happened along the extensive margin, i.e. women entering
in part-time employment.
Figure B1: Labor force participation in West Germany (1982 - 2015)
(a) Women and men (b) Mothers and fathers
Notes: The figures plots labor force participation of (a) women and men and of (b) mothers
and fathers over time. The sample is restricted to individuals aged between 25 and 55 living in
West Germany.
Source: Microcensus 1982-2015, own calculation.
In addition, in West Germany there was a massive expansion of publicly funded child care
along the intensive and extensive margin. The fraction of children below the age of three in
publicly funded child care increased from 1.4 % in 1994 to 33 % in 2016. For children aged three
and over, the share increased from 75 to 94 %, respectively. However, the increase in child care
provision happened heterogeneously across counties. Other family policies, e.g. the parental leave
benefit reform in 2006 (?), also shifted toward supporting reconciliation of work and family life.
However, family policies in reunified Germany reflect the ongoing conflict between supporting
and incentivizing traditional family models and increasing the compatibility of work and family
duties for dual-earner families. For example, married couples are taxed jointly within a splitting
income taxation system that sets strong incentive for an unequal division of paid work within
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Figure B2: Working hours in West Germany (1982 - 2015)
(a) Women and men (b) Mothers and fathers
Notes: The figures plots working hours of (a) women and men and of (b) mothers and fathers
over time. The sample is restricted to individuals aged between 25 and 55 living in West
Germany.
Source: Microcensus 1982-2015, own calculation.
Figure B3: Full-time employment in West Germany (1985 - 2015)
(a) Women and men (b) Mothers and fathers
Notes: The figures plots the fraction of (a) women and men and of (b) mothers and fathers in
full-time employment (conditional on labor force participation) over time. The sample is
restricted to individuals aged between 25 and 55 living in West Germany.
Source: Microcensus 1982-2015, own calculation.
married couples. Another example is a family subsidy for stay-at-home mothers who do not use
publicly funded child care. It was introduced on the federal level in 2013 and then abolished in
2015, but continued to be in place in some German states.
In East Germany, there was a substantial decrease in labor force participation of women,
partially driven by a significant cut in child care funding, and thus, in the number of available
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places (see also Figure A1), the adoption of West German family policies and the general economic
crisis that triggered substantial mass layoffs.
B.2 Measurement Issues
B.2.1 Identifying West Germans in the various datasets
Mircrocensus In the Microcensus, we cannot directly observe where people grew up, i.e.
whether they grew up in East or West Germany. Instead, we rely on information about the
highest schooling or vocational degree. We restrict the analysis to individuals born between 1945
and 1975 to ensure we capture all movers and exclude them from our analysis, i.e. individuals
who grew up under the former GDR regime and then moved to West Germany.
We define someone as West German if they did not grew up under the former GDR regime and
thus have no degree from a POS (Politechnische Oberschule), a degree from an EOS (Erweiterte
Oberschule) or a degree from one of the GDR colleges (Fachschulen). In the former GDR, the POS
were established in 1959 and replaced the former comprehensive primary schools (Einheitsschule).
All children from the age of six were obliged to enroll in a POS, which was first designed as an
eight year track and later extended to 10 years of schooling (e.g. Anweiler, 2013). A small fraction
of children was allowed to continue in an EOS (about 10 %), which prepared pupils for entry
into higher education (Fachschulen). The fraction of children leaving without a schooling degree
was relatively low. Handicapped and/or children with learning disabilities were taught in special
schools. We can not identify East Germans if they leave without a schooling degree or a degree
from a special schools. To address the former, we exclude individuals without a schooling degree
or missing information from our estimation sample. Since the rate of marriage between East and
West Germans in West Germany is very low (see also table 6), we use a household definition to
best capture and exclude all individuals who grew up in East Germany from the analysis.
SOEP Identifying individuals who grew up in West Germany in the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) is straightforward. All respondents are asked if they lived in East or West Germany
in 1989. We define all individuals who lived in West Germany in 1989 as West Germans.
ALLBUS In the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS), we have information on the
state where the respondent spent their youth and where they were born. Thus, we can infer
if someone grew up in West Germany. Individuals growing up in Berlin are excluded from our
estimation sample.
Migration data In the migration data, we have yearly, county level information on the total
number of individuals who moved to one of the West German counties and had their last place
of residence in one of the East German counties. Thus, we know the county of origin and the
destination county for each individual who moved between 1991 and 2015. In particular, in the
early years after the fall of the wall, there was hardly any West to East migration. Thus, we can
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precisely capture inflows from East Germany. In later years, we can not assume with certainty
that individuals moving from East to West Germany actually grew up under the GDR regime.
However, we cannot track individuals over time. Thus, we are unable to observe subsequent
moves and cannot exclude that some of the East Germans moved from one to another county in
West Germany.
B.2.2 Bounding the potential measurement error in the Microcensus
One major threat to our interpretation would be to misclassify East German women as West
Germans. This would mechanically bias our estimates upwards since East German women exhibit
strikingly different labor market outcomes even after moving to the western part of Germany. In
the following, we provide a simple back of the envelope calculation to bound the potential effect
bias in the Microcensus caused by this measurement error. To do this, we first estimate the share
of women from East Germany who are now living in West Germany (overall and by treatment
status) using different data sets. Second, we validate our Mircrocensus measure using the East
German sample to estimate the fraction that we misclassify. Third, we bound the potential effect
bias, using actual labor market outcomes of East German women in West Germany.
Estimating the overall share of women (or men) in West Germany who grew up under the
former GDR regime is difficult. This is one major reason why we rely on exact migration statistics
and do not take crudely estimated stocks of East Germans as our main independent variable.
In the Microcensus, based on educational degrees, we obtain an average share of East German
women in West Germany of about 3.77 %; 3.86 % (6.51 % in 2015) in treated (HighInflow) and
2.7 % (4.76 % in 2015) in control regions (see also figure B4).
Using SOEP data and applying the same age and cohort restriction as in our main analysis
gives an estimate of about 2.6 % (standard deviation of 15.80), 3.1 % (4.3 % in 2015) in treated
regions and 2.1 % (2.9 % in 2015) in control regions. Remember that in the SOEP every individual
is asked about the place of residence in 1989. However, given the small sample size and the panel
structure of this data set, this share is not very precisely estimated. We use this share as a
lower bound. Estimating the share of East Germans in West Germany using our migration data
(BBSR; 2017), and assuming that all individuals stayed in West Germany after migrations, gives
an averages share of about 3.7 % in post-reunification years (6.5 % in 2015); 4.8 % (8.3 % in 2015)
in treated and 2.7 % (4.9 % in 2015) in control regions. There are several reasons why this share
is likely to be overestimated. Some East Germans might move abroad, back to East Germany
or die. In addition, we might misclassify some West Germans who moved to East Germany and
then returned. Also note that we cannot differentiate between men and women. We use this
estimate as an upper bound, for the ”true” share of East Germans in our data set.
Next, we validate the Microcensus measure that is based on reported GDR specific edu-
cational degrees by estimating the share of East Germans based on the schooling definition in
East Germany. Using our sample restrictions described above, we get a share of 95 % in 1991
(the first wave available in East Germany). Under the assumption that East German women
in West Germany exhibit similar reporting errors, we only miss 5 % of East German women in
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West Germany. This remaining 5 % could either be individuals who went to one of the special
schools or individuals who misreport their highest schooling degree. Under the assumption that
the measurement error does not differ between East German movers and stayers as well as taking
the average share of East German women in West Germany from the Microcensus (3.77
Using the estimates SOEP numbers, gives us a lower bound of 99.87 % (100 - 0.05 * 2.6)
of correctly identified West German women and using the migration statistic an upper bound
of 99.815 % (100 - 0.05 * 3.7). Differentiating these numbers by treatment and control regions
provides us with the following estimates: in treated regions a lower bound based on SOEP data
of 99.845 % (100 - 0.05 * 3.1) and an upper bound based on migration statistics of 99.76 % (100 -
0.05 * 4.8). The respective shares in control regions are 99.895 % (100 - 0.05 * 2.1) based on SOEP
data and 99.865 % (100 - 0.05 * 2.7) based on migration statistics. Thus, the difference between
treatment and control regions in the fraction of correctly identified West Germans amounts to
0.05 % in SOEP data and 0.085 % in the migration statistic.
Now assume that East German women exhibit similar labor supply patterns in treatment
and control regions: They work on average 3.6 hours more per week than West German women,
employed East German women work 1.9 hours more than employed West German women and
a 3.1 ppt higher share of total working hours within households. Applying the estimated differ-
ences in misclassification between treatment and control regions to these different labor market
outcomes, gives the following result: The misclassification might cause a positive bias of 0.0021
hours per week (0.00057 * 3.6 hours), 0.0011 hours (0.00057 * 1.9 hours) and 0.0018 ppt (0.00057
* 0.31 ppt). The lower bound based on SOEP data corresponds to 0.0020 hours (0.00055 *
3.6 hours), 0.0011 (0.00055 * 1.9 hours) and 0.0002 ppt (0.00055 * 0.31 ppt) for the respective
outcomes. The upper bound based on migration statistics correspond to 0.0031 hours (0.00085
* 3.6 hours), 0.0016 (0.00085 * 1.9 hours) and 0.0003 ppt (0.00085 * 0.31 ppt), respectively.
To sum up, the size of measurement error and the resulting effect bias is negligible and cannot
drive our results.
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Notes: The figures plot the share of East Germans who live in West Germany relative to the
total population in West Germany using different data sets. The right hand figures show the
share overall and the right hand figures the share separately for treatment (HighInflow) and
control regions.
Source: SOEP 1990-2015, Microcensus 1991 - 2015, BBSR (2017), own calculation.
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